美国社会规制研究的三种路径

当西方社会规制研究兴起于20世纪70年代初,除了规制经济学中的公益理论和规制捕获理论影响到社会规制研究外,经济学的成本效益分析、公共选择、政治学的制度主义都渗入到社会规制的研究中.本文主要介绍这三种分析路径在西方社会规制研究中运用,并作出简要的评论.     

技术内生化、长期经济增长与财税政策选择

新古典经济理论认为,由于资本边际收益递减以及不变要素假定,一国经济增长将最终达到稳态均衡和零增长。内生增长理论则表明,由于人力资本、知识存量、生产性公共资本、研究与开发等内生性因素的不断积累,长期经济增长不会出现新古典理论预言的悲观情况,并且合适的财政政策在一国经济长期增长中发挥着重要作用。我国要保持持续的长期经济增长,就必须采取有效的财税政策,增加人力资本、生产性公共资本、研究与开发等方面的投资,加快人力资本积累和促进技术进步。     

川渝毗邻地区合作示范区协同发展研究 ———基于哈肯模型的实证分析

摘 要：本文将川渝毗邻地区合作共建区域发展功能平台统称为川渝毗邻地区合作示范区（以下简称“示范区”）,并以此为研究对象,通过泰尔L指数,测度示范区经济发展差异,随后运用哈肯模型、耦合协调和灰色关联度等方法进行协调度分析。研究发现,各示范区经济发展差异较小,经济发展趋同,加剧示范区之间的竞争,削弱协同合作,抑制比较优势的发挥和提升;成渝“双核”对示范区的辐射带动作用不明显,示范区总体与成渝“双核”的差距仍然较大;在示范区协同发展中,经济金融活动发挥着主导作用,经济环境与金融支持协调发展趋势向好,金融支持对示范区协同发展有显著的正向影响。基于此,建议大力发展新型金融业态,为优势产业发展营造良好的金融支持环境;开辟特色金融“试验区”,引入特色金融活水,有针对性地加强各示范区优势产业和特色产业的金融支持,进一步提升比较优势,强化示范区与成渝“双核”的经济联系,为成渝地区双城经济圈高质量发展提供重要支撑。     

Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management

Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.     

公司治理思想的历史演变及其经验启示

现代企业之间的竞争,也是治理结构的竞争.在此,以文献梳理的形式,对公司治理的内涵及理论渊源进行阐述,并评析了治理模式、形成原因及趋同表现.在我国治理模式选择的问题上,提出应汲取西方治理经验并结合我国国情,在基于利益相关者的原则下,着力构建内部治理与外部治理相结合,以内部治理为主的中国特色公司治理结构.     

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Summary. This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Received: October 9, 2001; revised version: April 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank Licun Xue, Joseph Greenberg and the participants of PET 2000 for very helpful suggestions. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for his/her valuable comments. The paper has been previously circulated under the title Binding Agreements.     

Publishing performance in economics: Spanish rankings (1990–1999)

Abstract. This paper contributes to the growing literature that analyses the Spanish publishing performance in Economics throughout the 1990s. Several bibliometric indicators are used in order to provide Spanish rankings (of both institutions and individual authors) based on Econlit journals. Further, lists of the ten most influential authors and articles over that period, in terms of citations, are reported. We are grateful to many colleagues who made very useful remarks to preliminary versions of this paper, as well as to two anonymous referees. We are particularly indebted to Xavier Sala-i-Martín, without whose invaluable help this work would not have been possible. All errors or omissions are of our exclusive responsibility.     

Testing of unit roots and other fractionally integrated hypotheses in the presence of structural breaks

Tests of unit roots and other nonstationary hypotheses that were proposed by Robinson (1994) are applied in this article to the Nelson and Plosser's (1982) series. The tests can be expressed in a way allowing for structural breaks under both the null and the alternative hypotheses. When applying the tests to the same dataset as in Perron (1989), we observe that our results might be consistent with those in Perron (1989) when testing the nulls of trend-stationarity or a unit-root. However, we also observe that fractionally integrated hypotheses may be plausible alternatives in the context of structural breaks at a known period of time. Final version received: August 2000/Final version accepted: August 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the European TMR grant No. ERBFMRX-CT-98-0213. Comments of two anonymous referees are also acknowledged.     

Distributional assumptions and a test of the dual labor market hypothesis

Recent application of the switching regression model to allocate workers into the primary and secondary labor markets is considered to be the best solution to the classification problem of the empirical testing of the dual labor market theory. In such models, normality of the error terms is assumed. This paper adopts the switching regression model to test the dual labor market theory by assuming different distributions of the error terms. The test results strongly support the dual labor market theory regardless of the assumption one makes about the error terms. However, the results indicate that different distribution can lead to different percentage distributions of workers in the two segments. In particular, the normal distribution generates more workers in the primary segment than the non-normal distributions. Therefore, care must be taken not to generalize the type of industries or occupations that fall under the primary and secondary segments. First version received: October 2000/Final version received: March 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  I would like to thank Kevin Lang, Robert Marshall, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am grateful for comments received from the session participants of the Western Economic Association International Conference, San Francisco, CA, June 28–July 2, 1996, and the Midwest Economic Association Conference, Kansas City, 1997. I thank George Bonney, the Chief Statistician of Fox Chase Cancer Center, Philadelphia for his comments. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Penn State Research and Development Grant, 1995.     

Human–capital investment and the wage gap

Summary. According to empirical studies, the wage differential by skills evolved non–monotonically in the past decades although the relative supply of skilled labor steadily increased. The present paper provides a theoretical explanation for this finding. In our setting, technological change intertemporally alters the human–capital investment incentives of heterogeneous individuals. As a consequence of changing incentives, the time path of the relative wage is U–shaped while there is a rise in the share of skilled workers. Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: January 30, 2001